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Iles; of'S'upervisor4 of'Richmond C" �. v. Rhoads,
Supreme Court ol' Virginia
August 31, 2017, Decided
Record No. 161209
Reporter
294 Va. 43 *; 803 S.E.2d 329 "*: 2017 Va. LEXIS 110?p17 WL 3765193
BC)ARI) OF SUPERVISORS OF RICHuI(Adetermination.
COUNTY v. JANIE L. RHOADS, ET AL.
Prior History: [***1] FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF RICHMOND COUNTY. Harry T.
Taliaferro, III, Judge.
Bc:_l...Ql',S�a ervi�sor's v�Rhnrrc s 2("),I C) rr..I,L;::IS 202
_-L - - -, ._._.__________-_-___--____
Disposition: Affirmed.
Case Summary
Overview
HOLDINGS: [ 1 ]-'Va. Cade? Al"I". ;S 15.2-2 i' 11(C)
was correctly applied to conclude that a certificate
issued by a zoning acinlinistrator was not vold ab
initio where, due to its plain language and remedial
nature, �S .15.2-2311((',) manifestly created a
legislatively -mandated limited exception to the
general principle that a building permit issued in
violation of applicable zoning ordinances was void;
[2]-The signed certificate was a written order by the
zoning administrator as it clearly constituted a
determination that the owners' building plans for a
garage complied with the zoning ordinances; [3]-
Pursuant to .;S 15.2-2311(C.), tile owners had a
vested right to use their property in the manner
ol'iginally approved by the zoning administrator
where approval was within the administrator's
delegated authority; more than 60 days had passed,
and the owners materially relied upon the
Outcome
Judgment. affirmed.
Counsel: For BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
RICHMOND COUNTY, Appellant:
MCROBERTS, ANDREW RAY; (ESQ.),
MAC:KENZIE, C:HRISTOPHER MIC:HAEL,
(ESQ.).
For RHOADS, JANIE L., RHOADS, EDMUND,
RHOADS, CRYSTAL, RHOADS, MEADE,
Appellees: MONDAY, MONICA TAYLOR,
(ESQ.), WRIGHT, ICATHLEEN LYNCH, (ESQ.),
BUGG, ALBERT DAVIS, JR., (ESQ), BUGG,
ALBERT DAVIS, III, (ESQ.).
Judges: OPINION BY JUSTIC.'E S. BERNARD
GOODWYN.
Opinion by: S. BERNARD GOODWYN
Opinion
[**3311 [*461 PRESENT: All the Justices
OPINION BY JL'
GOODWYN STIC'E S. BERNARD
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court
erred in applying1 and ruling
thatproperty owners had a vested right to the use of
their property in violation of a zoning ordinance,
Nvhen more than 60 days elapsed after the zoning
administrator issued a determination which allowed
John MAUS
294 Va. 43, *46; 803 S.E.2d 329, **331; 2017 Va. LEXIS 110, ***1 Page 2 of 7
that use; and the property owners materially
changed their position in good froth reliance upon
that CleteI'111I . tiOn.
[*47] BACKGROUND
Janie Rhoads, Edmund Rhoads, Crystal Rhoads,
and Meade Rhoads (collectively, the Rhoadses)
own property in Richmond County (the Property).'
On November 13, 2013, the Mloadses filed an
application for a Zoning Certificate of Compliance
(Application) [***2] to build a "2-story all
unfinished detached ga.ra.ge" (Garage) on the
Property, and attached architectural drawings of the
proposed Garage. The Richmond County (County)
zoning administrator, Morgan Quicke (Quicke),
visited the Property, which has a one-story primary
dwelling, before checking the box for "Approved"
on the Application and signing the Certificate of
Compliance (Certificate) on November M 2013.`
The Certificate included instructions regard in, how
to appeal if the Application was denied.- The
Rhoadses completed the Garage in June 2014 at a
cost of approximately $27,000.
In July 2014, Joseph Quesenberry, the new County
zoning adniinistra.tor (Quesenberry), informed the
Rhoadses that the previously approved Garage was
in violation . f Richmond County Zoning Ordinance
(Zoning Ordinance) Section 2-3-6 (the Ordinance),
because it was taller than the primary structure oil
the Property. On September 24, 2014, a written
notice of zoning violation was sent to the Rhoadses,
advising them that the Garao,e Was in violation of
the Ordinance (Notice).
The Rhoadses appealed the. Notice to the County
Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) by letter dated
October 13, 2014. The stated ar•ounds for the appeal
t Meade Rhoads was not initially a party to the two lawsuits
discussed below, but lie later became an owner of the Property and
was added as a defendant to die in_junetion case brought by the Board
by Order dated October 19. 201 S.
'Quicke was both the County administrator and the acting County
zoning official at the tittle.
were that the [***3] Rhoadses had received a
Certificate of Compliance signed by the County's
z(,.)ning administrator, the Rhoadses had relied upon
the Certificate in building the Garage, and, under
15.? their "rights [had] vested and
the permits for erection of. the [Garage] are not
subject to revocation or reversal." The BZA denied
the Rhoadses' appeal, and affirmed Quesenberrv's
decision that the Garage violated the Ordinance.
On February 23, 2015, pursuant to Clocle c .I .2—
2314, the Rhoadses appealed the. BZA's decision by
filing a petition for [*48] certiorari in the Circuit.
Court of Richmond County (Rhoadses' Appeal).
The County Board of Supervisors (Board) filed an
answer to the Rhoadses' Appeal and also filed a
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Rhoadses, requesting a declaration that
t11e Garage is in violation of the Ordinance and an
injunction to prevent the continued violation of the
Ordinance (Board Case).
On October 19, 2015, the circuit court held an ore
tenus hearing to address both the Rhoadses' Appeal
and the Board Case, and admitted into evidence a
joint stipulation of undisputed facts and evidence
regarding the history of- the Property and the
Garage project. The Rhoadses stipulated that the
CTarage [***4] violated the Ordinance, but for the
approval of the zoning administrator, and the Board
stipulated that Quicke visited the Property in
September 2013, and "knew, as of that site visit,
that the primary structure was one-story in height."
Meade Rhoads testified that, prior to beginning the
Garage project, lie and his contractor met with the
County code compliance officer at the Property,
and the code compliance officer suggested a. two-
story garage. The two-story Garage design was
submitted in the Application, for the zoning
administrator's approval. Quicke acknowledged that
the [**332] Application showed a 14 by 32 feet,
two-story garage, but testified that hee did not read
the Application or look at the plan attached to the
Application before signing the Certificate, in his
capacity as the County's zoning administrator. After
John MAUS
Page 3 of 7
294 Va. 43, "48; 803 S.E.2d 329, "332; 2017 Va. LEXIS 110, `4
receiving the Certificate, the Rhoadses built. the
Garage, according to the plans approved. by the
Certificate.
The Rhoadses asserted that the BZA erred by
failina to find that their rights, in the zoning
administrator's initial determination, vested
pursuant to Code, SS. 75, 2-231.1(C,'. The Board
.._ ....._. -
asserted that Code �R 15.2-23111Ci did not apply
and that the BZA's decision should be affirmed.
On May 18, 2016, the circuit [***5] court entered
its final order in both cases and held that "C 061e. ti
15.2-2`3.11 applies, and the Rhoads[es] have
established their entitlement to relief under that
provision." Accordingly, the ,circuit court reversed
the BZA decision, and entered .judglnent in favor of
the Rhoadses in the Rhoadses' Appeal. It also
denied the Board's requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief, and entered _judgment in favor of
the Rhoadses in the Board Case as well.
[*49] The Board appeals both cases..3
AxtALYsis
The Board argues that (tocle i-_l 5.2-2311 does
not apply, because Quicke "lacked the authority to
approve a plain violation of the Zoning Ordinance,
and. the Certificate he issued was therefore void ab
initio." The Board also claims that ('ocae .15.2-
2311(CZ does not apply in this case because the
Certificate was not a "determination" within the
meaning of the statute. Additionally, it asserts that
the circuit court erred because
only applies to bar the subsequent actions of a
zoning administrator or other administrative officer,
and not those of any other body, such as the Board
01' a court.
The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court
correctly interpreted and applied the terms of C'e)&7
.y� ..............__l..,f_:_2,-?,1 !_C.;1 • This Court reviews the
The two cnAas, which were tried together bu.t not fornmlly
consolidated in the circuit court, have been joined in this appeal.
interpretation of a. statute de novo. 1Volle v. .rff
.Tech. Enter•s...1.;.1:C'o 284 Ira, 80, 89 726 S. E 2d 339.
344....(20.12),.
When the language of [***6] a statute is
unambiguous, we are bound by the plain
meaning of that language. Furthermore, we
must give effect to the legislature's intention as
expressed by the language used unless a literal
interpretation of the language would result in a
manifest absurdity. If a statwe is subject to
more than one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the legislative
intent behind the statute.
Id. d 89-90, 726 S.1'. 2d cal 344.
.._..aS...._:1..5__.7.-.23.1:1 governs appeals to a board of
zoning appeals. (.:'cede.15.2-2.11 rQ specifically
provides:
In no event shall a written order, requirement;
decision or determination made by the zoning
administrator or other administrative officer be
subject to ch.e: nge, lnoclification or reversal by
any earring aelrninistrolor or other
och-ninisirative off cer after 60 cla}-s have
elapsecl f wn. the elate of the written order,
requirerrrerrt, ['50] clecisiori or eleterrnirrcition
where the person aggrieved has materially
changed his position in good faith reliance on
the action of the zoning administrator or other
administrative officer unless it is proven that.
such written order; requirement, decision or
determination was obtained through
malfeasalice of the zoning administrator or
other administrative officer or througll fraud.
The 60-day limitation [***7] period shall not
apply in any case where, with the concurrence
of the attorney for the governing body,
modification is required to correct clerical
errors.
(Emphasis added.)
By its plain terms, the prerequisites for Code s
1 S^2 _Z _t I t.o apply are: (1) a "written order,
requirement, decision or determination made by tile.
John MAUS
294 Va. 43, '50; 803 S.E.2d 329, *"332; 2017 Va. LEXIS 110, `7 P`j°r 4 of
zoning administrator;" (2) the passage of at least 60
days from the zoning administrator's deternlinatic) n:
and (3) a material change in position "ill good faith
reliance on the action of the zoning administrator."
[**333] It is agreed that, more than 60 days
elapsed between the zoning administrator's initial
approval of the zoning and Ili
s successor's later
assertion of a zoning violation; Quesenberry did not
advise the Rhoadses that the Garage violated the
Ordinance until rilore than 240 days after Quicke
signed the Certificate, approving the Garage. It is
also undisputed that the Rhoadses materially
changed their position in good faith reliance on the
zoning administrator's approval of the zoning for
then- building plans; because they built the Garage
at a cost of nearly $27,000.
The Board claims that the circuit court erred in
applying ('cc7c; 5y....1.:5.2-2 11(C,1 because the zoning
........... _ ..........
a.dnlrllistlator granted a Certificate that \vas [***8]
in clear violation of the Zoning Ordinance, and that
the Certificate -as therefore void ah in do and
could not be. a "written order, requirement, decision
or determination" under C.,.gK.1c`:......a........1..- -._ .: y.-7_�..l..l '1.. In
support of its position, the County notes that this
Court has previously held that a landowner had no
rights in a building permit that was issued in
violation of applicable zoning ordinances. See
?c1899, 900-01 (1980) (holding that a building
permit issued at variance with the zoning ordinance
was "void cab ]lido" and "no vested rights Nvere.
acquired [thereunder] by the permittee"); [*51]
I-4-'el 1r 1 hic. v. 1 o'l,J1 2.19 J."o. 57 0 641. 244 ,.S.
76Q,._7G4 .(1 t 7'31 (concluding that a building permit
issued in violation of the zoning ordinance was
cord : anc ,Scz crlcl rf. (..ri .�?... �fc?vr1 �rt�^I b't'v�rs,....._ .0 ). _.... _._._..1.. _.-f__..-...__...... _ . ___.-..__
T'(r. 259, 261-6-) 16' .S'.1:..2(1 135, l i7 �T�?t„S,J
..____...._._.._........._.._..._..___.._..__..___....__.._......1.._....'--"'---......__...............:.............__.._..__.:...... .... .............._.:................ ...._... . .
(sarne).
As noted by the Board, prior to 1995 administrative
zoning decisions that violated the zoning laws were
void and property owners bore the sole
responsibility for the consequences of a.
government's zoning mistake. See, e.., Scµfr�:xloJj
09 Ent cil 2-.62 163�5�.1'_2cl of 137. However,
1995, the General Assembly enacted the "vested
rights" provision cul-i-ently codified in C ode 15.2-
2:3L.I.-(Q. 1995 Acts ch. 424. The plain language of
152:2jj.1((')_ indicates that the statute is
intended to eliminate the hardship property owners
have suffered when they rely to their de.trilnent
upon erroneous or void zoning decisions.
We have characterized [***9] as remedial those
statutes that provide protections to those otherwise
not in a position to effectively defend themselves.
See, e.g., C nmm<7rt col S ecioltre� I u.
:1 C:':1't C 'crraslr. 114gnit C c» 1? 242 Va 102, 10 S _06,
405 S 1 'c1 852. 854 7 V � .L,rrVr 1ie1� �'�'� 3 (�1 �9 11 ......_..
(concluding that a statute regarding bond
requirements for contractors who contract with
public agencies was remedial, because it was
designed to protect subcontractors and materialmen
who could not perfect rnechanic's liens against
public property); Gotcrir�rrrc>,rrt 1'rr�s'_ Irr`'. ('r�. v
t.:hi,i!ed , 5eras. uric. Ass`ri, 2b'.1 Va. 647, 657 Lb'
.S' 1.' ?d 87: ,. 5'83 (2011) (explaining that "Code ti
:- .._...._........._..._._>.
38.2-2204, tlae omnibus clause, is a remedial statute
enacted to serve the public policy of broadening the
coverage of automobile liability insurance for the
protection of the in.persons"). (1o(le 1„5.,2-
?311 is a remedial statute.
The remedial purpose of t_ocle $ 15.2-2311((�_ is to
provide relief and protection to property owners
\-vho detrimentally rely in good faith upon
erroneous zoning determinations and who would
otherwise suffer loss because of their reliance upon
the zoning administrator's error. A statute that is
remedial in nature is "liberally construed so that the
purpose intended may be accomplished," and is to
be "read so as to promote the ability of the
enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is
directed." al(rhr_r...._Y_ CT,L„1.IC1U_.�-(.:ta:.:....._f:'cl.:.,_.W'_93..._1�'cr..i7.1
... . .................... .
1ty _798 �S-E.2d 98 Ci08 (.='�17J (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
[*52] Considering the plain language and remedial
nature of the [***10] statute,C.`rlcic._�'_1..5.:?-:?;311._((.).
manifestly creates a legislatively -mandated limited
John MAUS
294 Va. 43, *52; 803 S.E.2d 329, —333; 2017 Va. LEXIS 110..-10
Page 5 of 7
exception to the judicially -created general principle
that a building permit issued in violation of
applicable zoning ordinances is void. See Tvcrrdc_k
u Poi,Malan I'illcr4t; ;�Homeoitners_,4ss n. 291_Vo.
269. 276 n.4. 784 S.E.2c1 280, 83 n.4 (2016)
(noting that "[a]brogation of the common law
requires that the General Assembly plainly manifest
an intent to do so") (citation and internal quotation
inarks omitted.). As this Court has previously noted,
"Code__-ti:15_.2-?31:1_L(-') . . . provide[s] for the
potential vesting of a. right to use property in a
manner [**334] that. 'otherwise would not have
been allowed." L;(Y on(.7ya v. Boorcl of Zoning
'7� _..._►.h`. -'......... 2 44 657 ,S'../ : 2d .1.53. 16 0
........-:-.................................................._................................._......_. .
L2I(Q& (citation omitted). The circuit court did not
err in rejecting the Board's claiin that the Certificate
was void ob initio because the Certificate granted a
right to use property in a manner that otherwise
would not have been allowed udder the Zoning
Ordinance.
The Board claims that even if the Certificate was
not void ah initio, the signed Certificate was still
not a "written order, requirement, decision or
determination" by the zoning administrator. We
disagree.
In issuing the Certificate, the zoning administrator
necessarily made a d.eterniination that the building
plaids complied with tile Zoning Ordinance in all
respects. See Zoning Ordinance Section 3-7-1(A')
(providing that a. certificate of [***11] collipliance
will be issued "for those proposals which have
obtained all necessary approvals and perinits and
comply with this [Zoning] Ordinance") and Section
5-3 (defining the term "certificate of compliance"
as "[c]ertification by the Land Use Administrator
that the plans are in compliance with this [Zoning]
Ordinance"). Although the Board argues to the
contrary, it is irrelevant that the decision or
determination evidenced by the Certificate makes
no reference to the height of the Garage or to the
Zoning adininistrator's intent to waive the
requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. Such
specificity is not required by C.`occ�15.2-2,311 �.
The issuance of tlue Certificate clearly constitutes a.
decision or determination by the zoning
administrator that. the building plans complied with
the Zoning Ordinance.
[*53] The conclusion that the Certificate
constitutes a determination by the zoning
administrator is consistent with our prior cases
involving (c 'c�...... �`......:.-5 _.:?.-' 3.I L.ir1.. In Ngf fcllk.:...._IO2
...1
W.- V- Cut t1f N-Q^ olk,__ j8S >%a. 540_ .354-56, 7,38
S'.'.2c1 <ti'95.._90312(113J, we held that Code .15 2-
'31..... did not apply to a "Cash Receipt" signed
by a. zoning administrator, because that document
"was not a specific determination by the zoning
administrator or any other City official that either
of these businesses could use their respective
premises in a manner not otherwise
allowed [***12] under the zoning ordinances in
effect at that tine." Similarly, in Joi nE>,s v. C.'ily af'
1-falls C'hur-c h .280 Va.:i 1 44, 694 .Y-E.2d 568, 575
_ falls ....._.................__...........................r......._..__._.
-...._._......._.............._..............._..
(2111 J, we held that a zoning administrator's mere
"interpretation" of a zoning ordinance "lacked the
finality of an 'order, requirement, decision or
determination' under Cade' J.?. 2-2:i I.1(C�," such
that no vesting occurred.
In contrast, the Certificate was a written
determination by the zoning administrator that a
particular building; plan oli a particular property
complied with the applicable zoning ordinances, It
affirmatively approved the zoning for the Garage
project at issue, The Certificate was a filial
determination, as this Court has required. See
Jczn�e.s. 280 Va. crt 44. 694 S. 2d r.7t 575 (a zoning
interpretation lacks the finality of an "order.
requirement, decision or determination" under
The Certificate itself
provided notice that the zoning administrator's
decision was appealable, which demonstrates that
the zoning administrator's involvement was Cina.1
after lie signed the Certificate. Thus, the Certificate
was a. deterniiila.tion by the zoning administrator
which satisfiedthat requirement under (.:(arle�t�l_5.2�•
i.:tl/_I_( —1)..•
The Board also claims that tic7de_S� 1"5.2_��.317((
only binds a zoning administrator, but need not and
John MAUS
294 Va. 43, "53; 803 S.E.2d 329, "'334; 2017 Va. LEXIS 110, "12 Page 6 of 7
should not be considered by any other body such as
a board. or a court. 111 determining if there is
all [***13] enforceable violation of a zoning
ordinance. In support of its position, the Board.
notes that this Court stated in ,Jctmes that t.;'r.>r,1e 4
1.-5...?.-.?.r.1.1('Cfi "only limits the subsequent actions of
al 'zoning aldnimistrattor Or other administrative
Off1Ce1',"' and "[t]he Planning Commission,
ho\,•ever, is neither," Id. al 43 _<�,!_S.f .:?c,l at 575.
The quoted langtaage from Jcrrnes should not be
interpreted as allowing the BZA and the Board to
ignore the requirements of and to evade the
application of CJrlcy in making the
[*54] determination of whether there is an
enforceable violation of a zoning ordinance. In
Jwnes, the appeal concerned a decision made by a
Planning commission. The planning commission,
not the zoning administrator, had authority over the
issue of approving the subdivision and
consolidation [**335] of properties which the
landowner requested. We noted that "Cock: 15.2=
2;%/I(C:1 [was] not applicable" to protect a property
mvrier against an adverse decision by a planning
commission regarding the subdivision and
consolidation of several properties after the zoning
aidnlinistrator issued an "interpretation" that such a
consolidation was permitted by the Zoning
Ordinance. 280 Vci._ 4 i-44. 94S-Z'_.2(1 al 5 J 4- 5.
Because there was only an interpretation; and no
determination by a "zoning administrator or other
administrative officer," we concluded that [***14]
this prerequisite for the application of Code �_ 15.2
?31.1_((.) was not present in that. case. There was no
vesting of a zoning deterilhinatloI . because no
zoning determination was made by the zoning
administrator. ('cicle?>> :152�731.1 K.) only provides
for vesting after a zoning determination. C o(Je
15.2-23.11(J could not possibly apply to limit the
subsequent actions of the planning commission.
The issue of whetherI,J uhust be
considered by other entities involved in the
enforcement of a zoning ordinance, after a zoning
administrator makes a decision or determination
which is relied upon by a property owner, was not
before the Court in Jcrrrre . By its terms, C.'acle
"Id its vesting provisions must be
considered and enforced by a BZA, a. board of
supervisors, or a court in malting a zoning
determination or reviewing its correctness, if the
prerequisites for the application of the statute are
satlsfled.`t
[*55] A zoning administrator is a representative of
his or her board of supervisors.' Boor(] o
- - ----
Srrlcltt�u�.s 1' Board a fr�nirz; r�111�ccrls, '6H 1'r...
415(J .51, 604 S. f �J........i, . .
principal is bound by representations of his agent,
made either in the scope of his employment or in
furtherance of the object for which lie is
employed." .fir rC c��tivi k>.._T1.rs......... t'c�._._1.:...._Ialter on,._....?.29
1/0. 627 632 331 S 1'. 2d J(]1 493 j1985j (internal
quotation marks onhitt.ed). Thus, when a zoning
administrator has acted within the scope Of his
employment and [***1.5] made a "decision" or
"determination" within the meaning of C___ocle 5'
15.2-23.I.1(Q, he or she has also bound the board of
supervisors. If C:Qdc 5ti 15: 7-2; 11((-') did not bind
.......
the board of supervisors a the zoning
administrator's principal, it would afford scant, if
any, protection to the property owner, and would
not serve to "remedy the mischief at which [the
statute] is directed," rllcrrzrr 293 Va. al389. 798
S..E.2J at 608. The remedial purpose of the statute
requires the statute to be interpreted so as. to
provide relief and protection to property o«,,ners
' By way of example, if a landowner appeals a zoningadminisuatm`s
notice of violation to a boarcl of zoning appeals, the board of zoning
appeals should consider whether the zoning administrator had the
right to issue such a violation under Code .2-.23111t j.. As we
noted in Gnpc» taga., the property owner has the "burden of
establishing the vesting of a right to an othenvise impermissible use
of property under Code � 1.2- 3 l.(Ca,. 2 _5.. Inc,+ ul 24,, pl' S._P_.2d
Ott 1._ .60. If the zouing� administrator is barred from changing his or her
.
prior determination by Clc....i; f S .'_?311iC;,i, the board of zoning
appeals must consider that statute in determining whether the zoning.
administrator errecl in finding there was an enforceable violation of
the zoning ordinance by the landowner.
Zoning Ordinance Section 5-3 defines the "lancl use a(Iministrator"
as "[t]he representative of the Ric}unond County Board of
Supervisors who has been appointed to serve as the agent of the
Governing Body in administering this Ordinance."
John MAUS
,
Page 7 of 7
294 Va. 43, *55: 803 S.E.2d 329, **335; 2017 Va. LEXIS 110, ***15
who rely in good faith upon erroneous zoning
determinations.
In this instance, the approval of the Certificate was
an action within the scope of the authority,
delegated by the Board to the zoning administrator.
The issuance of the Certificate constituted a
determination within the meaning of C'ocle ,� 1S.'-
311(C). Also, more than 60 clays elapsed after the
zoning administrator issued his determination that
the Garage complied with the Zoning Ordinance,
and the Rhoadses materially changed their position
in reliance upon that determination. Thus, the
prerequisites for the application of ("ocle $1 15.2-
?311(C are present in this case.
The Rlioadses' rights in using their property in the
manner initially approved by the zoning
administrator vested upon fulfillment [***16] of
the requirements of C ,.le �� 1.5. -.23.11(C). Once
their rights vested under CWoe)e " 15 2-23.11L they
were not subject to alteration [**336] by the
zoning adn-iinistrator, the BZA or the Board.
Therefoi-e, the circuit court did not err in applying
_.15.2-? 311(C1 to uphold the Rhoadses'
vested rights to use their property in the manner
originally approved by the zoning administrator.
[*56] CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court of
Richmond County.
4 ffirrne(l.
I -lid o(Docuwent
John MAUS